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COMMENT
THE SHEET METAL WORKERS CASE
On March 23, 1962, James Ballard, Negro aged 22, filed an application
for admission to the apprenticeship program in the sheet metal trades. The
four-year training program' is operated by the Joint Apprenticeship Commit-
tee (JAC), an agency composed of representatives of the union-Local No. 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association of Greater New York2-
and of the contractors-the Sheet Metal Contractors' Association of New York
City, Incorporated and the Mechanical Contractors' Association of New York,
Incorporated. The union selects apprentice candidates.3 The sole explicit re-
quirement for eligibility is an age between 18 and 23 years (25 years for
veterans), but past practice has established unofficial qualifications of a high
school diploma or equivalent and of sponsorship by a union member (waived
for veterans.) 5
Ballard, at the time of application, met the age requirement, possessed a
high school equivalency diploma and was a veteran.( Three months after ap-
plying, he was tested by the state Department of Labor and determined to
be qualified to undertake training for sheet metal work. The July, 1962 class
of 56 new apprentices did not include Ballard or any other Negro. Neither was
he (nor any other Negro) selected for the subsequent class of January, 1963.7
The entire membership of the union was white. Eighty per cent of all appren-
tices in training were relatives of union members.8
The Attorney Gerneral of New York filed a verified complaint with the
State Commission for Human Rights (SCHR) charging racial discrimination
against Ballard specifically and against Negroes generally, in violation of the
state Law Against Discrimination.9 The following respondents were named:
Local 28 and its president, the JAC, the secretary of Local 28 and the JAC, and
the individual union and contractor representatives serving as members of the
JAC. The Investigating Commissioner of SCHR found probable cause to credit
the allegations of the complaint, and thereupon attempted, according to es-
tablished SCHR procedure, to secure compliance with the Law by conciliation
1. Registered with the New York State Apprenticeship Council and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training.
2. Hereinafter cited as the union or Local 28.
3. Pursuant to the provisions of the Standard Form of Union Agreement; see Lefkowitz
v. Farrell, C-9287-63 (N.Y. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 1964) (mimeo.) at 2.
4. Ibid., Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Apprentices.
5. Instant case at 2, Brief of Intervener-Complainant pp. 7, 12. Hereinafter cited as
Attorney General's Brief.
6. Instant case at 2-3.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Ibid.
9. N.Y. Executive Law, art. 15, §§ 290-301. Hereinafter cited as LAD or the Law. The
alleged violations pertained to sections 296.1-a, 296.1(b) and 296.6.
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and persuasion. The failure of this effort resulted in noticing the case for
public hearing in September, 1963.10
The respondents collectively denied the discrimination charged in the com-
plaint. Local 28 asserted that apprentices were selected chronologically from a
waiting list of applicants, that Ballard was not, in fact, qualified and that
SCHR was without authority in the instant case to find a general discrimina-
tory pattern operating against Negroes as a group." In its opinion of Febru-
ary 26, 1964, the Commission found the acts of respondents violative of sec-
tions 296.1-a, 296.1(b) and 296.6 of the Law as charged by the Attorney
General.12 The Commission issued its order on March 20, 1964. Lefkowitz V.
Farrell, C-9287-63 (New York State Commission for Human Rights, 1964).
The respondents filed a petition for review of the Commission's order13
alleging that the order is invalid:
insofar as it purports to delegate to the Industrial Commissioner
the power to evaluate and determine, wholly unrelated to any dis-.
criminatory aspects, the reasonableness and suitability of minimum
qualifications for any apprenticeship training program to be established
by the Petitioners and insofar as it purports to delegate to the Com-
missioner of Education the power to designate an additional authority
to adjudicate complaints of discrimination in the administration of
the apprentice training program. 14
The petition is currently pending in Supreme Court, New York County.
SURVEY OF STATUTORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND EcONOmIC DEVELOPMENTS
RELATING TO APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS
In view of the recent investigation into the efficacy of FEP laws and com-
missions and the evaluation of the many factors affecting equal opportunity
in employment, this case assumes proportions beyond the vindication of one
10. Instant case at 2.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 22.
13. Paragraphs 1 and 8 are being challenged by respondents. Paragraph 1 requires that
the union and JAC formulate in writing, the minimum qualifications and objective standards
they intend to apply. However, 'Prior to adopting such minimum qualifications or any
specific objective standards, tests or requirements, said Local Union 28 and said Committee
shall submit the same to the Industrial Commissioner for his confidential evaluation of
their reasonableness and suitability for use in the selection of persons for sheet metal
apprenticeship training; and unless approved by the Industrial Commissioner, the same
shall not be adopted or used; provided, moreover, that in no event shall sponsorship by a
member or members of Local Union 28 be adopted as a requirement either for applying or
being selected for apprenticeship training."
Paragraph 8 deals with the review procedure available to a rejected applicant. "If an
applicant asserts or makes claim to said Local Union 28 or to said Committee that he was
not selected because of his race, creed, color or national origin, said applicant shall be
advised by said Local Union 28 or said Committee, in writing, within ten (10) days of
making such assertion or claim, that he may obtain review of the evaluation of his
qualifications by a competent authority to be designated by the Commissioner of Education
of the State of New York."
14. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10.
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Negro's right to apprentice training.15 For this reason, a brief overview of the
more obvious legal and economic considerations which frame the specific area
of discrimination in job training may appropriately precede a detailed scrutiny
of the instant case.
At the apex of the legal structure is the Civil Rights Act of July 2, 1964.10
Title VII, proscribing discriminatory employment practices on the part of
employers, employment agencies and labor organizations 17 in industries affec-
ting commerce' s deals, on the national level,' with two of the practices charged
in the Skeet Metal Workers complaint. Section 703(c) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude ...from its membership ...any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
And section 703(d) declares:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training ... to discriminate against any indivi-
dual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
apprenticeship or other training.
The general powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
established by the Civil Rights Act of 196420 parallel the grants to state
FEP commissions but reveal a specific concern for apprenticeship opportuni-
ties. The Commission is directed to require each employer, union and commit-
tee controlling training programs to keep records of applicants, of the
chronological order of applications and to supply the Commission with data
on selection methods. 21
Unlawful employment practice charges may be filed with the Equal
Opportunity Commission by the aggrieved person or by a member of the
Commission. 22 A civil action may be directly instituted by the Attorney Gen-
eral if he ". . . has reasonable cause to believe any person or group . . . is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by this title. .. 22
In New York, statutory controls emanate from the Law Against Dis-
crimination, the Civil Rights Law and the Labor Law.24 The first of these is
15. See subsequent analysis of the instant case for discussion of the pattern approach
utilized by SCHR.
16. Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
17. Section 701(b) (c) (d).
18. Section 701 (e) (g) (h).
19. The Act provides in section 708 that "person[s]" (defined in section 701(a) to
include labor unions) are not exempted from compliance with state statutes barring dis-
criminatory employment practices.
20. Section 705(a).
21. Section 709(c).
22. Section 706(a).
23. Section 707(a).
24. See also N.Y. Const. art. I § 11 (1938). See references in Conway, supra to section
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examined, and the work of the Commission created by it appraised, in the
papers of Herbert Hill and Henry Spitz, supra. The New York Civil Rights
Law bars exclusion from union membership on racial grounds and bars in-
equality of treatment of members on racial grounds.25 The amendment to the
New York Labor Law (section 815) which conforms to the recent additions to
LAD (section 296.1-a(a)) is treated below.
Established governmental agencies which possess some jurisdiction in
the apprenticeship area are the New York State Apprenticeship Council26 and
the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training in the federal Department of La-
bor.27 These agencies, at least to the present time, have not been equipped
with effective regulatory powers. They "register" apprenticeship agreements
which conform to agency standards, and may withdraw a registration if the
parties do not. comply with the terms of the agreement. The State Council
seeks to have labor and management adopt the "suggested standards for ap-
prenticeship agreements" contained in the Labor Law,2 8 but it has thus far
exercised no clear influence in the area of racial discrimination.
For a quarter of a century, the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training
has operated as a national agency to assist and encourage apprenticeship pro-
grams. Before 1961, the Bureau had not undertaken as part of its responsibili-
ties, the elimination of discriminatory practices in such programs.29 The House
hearings of that year, 0 as well as 1961 Report of the 'United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights3' exposed the necessity for nondiscrimination clauses
and for affirmative action in craft training programs under government con-
tract work. In 1963, the Secretary of Labor issued new standards applicable
to all federally registered apprenticeship programs.32 These instructions called
220-e of the New York Labor Law relating to employment discrimination under construction
contracts of the state or a municipality, and section 343-8.0 of the New York City Adminis-
trative Code. The New York standard contract form set forth in the appendix to Conway,
supra calls in clause (a) for affirmative action to ensure equal opportunity in "... selection
for training or retraining, including apprenticeship and on-the-job training."
25. Section 43.
26. N.Y. Labor Law, art. 23, §§ 810-818.
27. Created by the Fitzgerald Act of 1937, 50 stat. 664 (1937), 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1958).
28. N.Y. Labor Law § 815. This section illustrates a shift in emphasis. Before 1957
the provision (then § 814) contained "suggested standards for apprenticeship agreements"
which concentrated almost wholly on educational aspects, wages and hours. L. 1957, ch.
697, § 2 added a suggested standard that apprentices be hiied without discrimination; L.
1964, ch. 948, § 2 supplants the former hiring standard by a suggested provision that
apprentices be selected without discrimination.
29. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, State Advisory Committees Division,
Reports on Apprenticeships 5-6 (Jan. 1964).
30. Hearings on H.R. 8219 Before the House of Representatives Special Committee on
Labor of the Committee on Bducation and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
31. Employment 104-11 (1961).
32. 28 Fed. Reg. 11299-344 (Oct. 23, 1963). See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Ap-
prenticeship and Training, Non-discrimination in Apprenticeship and Training Policy,
Circular 64-7 (July 17, 1963). The new standards are interpreted to require that if prior
apprentice lists were not evolved on the basis of merit and equality of opportunity, the
sponsor must not only disregard prior lists but also offset the effects of previously dis-
criminatory practices. Such corrective action would include increasing the opportunities
for selection of a "significant number" of qualified members of minority groups.
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for affirmative action to ensure "full and fair opportunity for application"
for admission to training programs. The efficacy of the new standards has not,
as yet, been assessed.
On the national level also, the President's Committee on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity 33 (whose area of jurisdiction was increased in 1963)84 has
recognized that nondiscrimination agreements binding the primary contractor
do not ensure impartial admission to training programs.85 The Committee
has, therefore, more recently emphasized the need "to place more direct
responsibilities upon the union in recognition of its role in controlling access
to some kinds of employment."8 6
Apposite to this new direction of efforts by the President's Committee
is the conclusion reached by the New York Advisory Committee 7 to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. In its report, Building Construc-
tion in New York City,85 the Advisory Committee notes at the outset that
* . . the economic structure of the building industry tends to con-
centrate in the local unions the decision as to who obtains employ-
ment and, even more important, who gets admitted into the craft. The
dominating role of the union in construction employment affords to
contractors the opportunity to disclaim all responsibility for discrimi-
nation in the building trades. . . Our study found no instance in
which an employer sought to promote equal employment opportu-
nity in the building trades.8 9
The sociological aspects of the construction industry are characterized
not by a relatively stable employer-employee relationship, but by short-term
identification of the worker with a particular job and a particular employer.
The union operates as the employment agency, the training school and the
master of labor supply in the craft; by performing this dominant role, it may
be assumed to bear primary responsibility for discriminatory employment
practices.
In the New York City construction trade unions surveyed for the Advisory
Committee, Dr. Donald Shaughnessy found that, in general, objective tests
were not utilized to determine admission to apprenticeship programs and that
the number of union craftsmen was maintained at a level substantially below
local demand.40 Pointing to Local 28 of the International Sheet Metal Work-
ers Union, he noted that in 1963 there were no Negroes in the apprenticeship
program or in the union, and that admission to apprenticeship was dependent
33. Established by Executive Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 2, 1961).
34. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 11114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (June 22, 1963).
35. Op. cit. supra note 29, at 13.
36. Ibid.
37. Established pursuant to section 105(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat.
634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975d(a) (1958).
38. Op. cit. supra note 29, at 109-23. This report is based on the study made by
Dr. Donald Shaughnessy of Columbia University for the Advisory Committee.
39. Id. at 113-14.
40. Id. at 116-17.
COMMENT
upon sponsorship of an applicant by a union member.41 Local 2, United As-
sociation of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters exhibited the same total
exclusion of Negroes in 1963 and under-supplied the New York City demand
to the extent that 1,000 plumbers were imported from out of town to fill the
gap.4 2
The rationale underlying a limitation of numbers admitted to a craft
may be rooted in the union's belief in the classical theory of supply and de-
mand.48 But racial exclusion achieved through the practice of accepting only
relatives or "sponsored" friends has not been, nor can it be, justified by the
union on the basis of irrelevant economic theory and is, in fact, prohibited
by state law.44 It has continued as a modus operandi of some local unions,
unaffected by policies of federal or state apprenticeship agencies.4 5 The Ad-
visory Committee concluded:
4. By rigid limitations on the number of apprentices, the unions
have maintained a chronic labor shortage in the building trades ....
Union members value highly the right to secure admissions to appren-
ticeship programs-and tend to exercise it ... in favor of their sons,
nephews and others with whom they have personal connections.
5. Since admission to apprenticeship is controlled largely on a per-
sonal basis, . . . patterns of exclusion of Negroes will tend to be
perpetuated. 46
These conclusions are appropriate to the conditions existing within the
Sheet Metal Workers Union and to the labor market demand and supply pic-
ture in New York City. The members of Local 28 fabricate and erect air con-
ditioning systems in new buildings. 47 But this static union (maintaining a
level of about 3,000 members over-the past decade), with a static admission
policy (severely limiting the numbers of new craftsmen) has produced a
static labor supply-during a period of rising construction demands and pro-
jected serious shortages of skilled labor.48
The president of Local 28 candidly informed the Civil Rights Bureau
that:
.virtually all the new construction... in New York City following
the Second World War was covered by Local 28 contracts ...
[T]here frequently were insufficient numbers of union members . . .
available, and that Local 28 called upon sister locals of the Inter-
national from without the city, as well as allied trades in the building
trades council . . . and even upon a group of non-union specialty
men. .... 49
41. Id. at 116.
42. Ibid.
43. See e.g., Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 35 v. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953).
44. N.Y. Executive Law § 296.
45. Op. cit. supra note 29, at 115, 121.
46. Id. at 120.
47. Respondents' Brief, p. 2.
48. Instant case at 13.
49. Id. at 14.
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There is no question that at the time and place of Ballard's application for
apprenticeship training, Local 28 possessed monopolistic power over its craft
in New York City.
TB: SCOPE OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS CASE
On all the evidence, SCHR concluded that three provisions of the Law
had been violated in the instant case.
1. Violation of Section 296.1-a
First, the union and JAC were held to have contravened section 296.1-a.
At the time the Commission's decision was rendered, section 296.1-a(a) pro-
scribed it as a discriminatory practice on the part of an employer, union or
labor-management committee "To deny to . . . any qualified person because
of race, creed, color or national origin the right to be admitted to . . . an
apprenticeship training program. . . ." The questions which, therefore, re-
quired answers were: Was Ballard "qualified"? and, Was he denied admis-
sion on racial grounds?
Ballard met the mandatory requirement applicable to age. As a veteran
possessing a high school equivalency diploma, he met the educational pref-
erence and was exempt from the sponsorship preference, which preferences
although not embodied in the written specifications were nonetheless embedded
in the selection practices of the union.50
Assuming Ballard was qualified, was he excluded because he was a
Negro? Respondents alleged that Ballard's application was filed in the same
manner as other applications 5' and his name placed on the chronological list.
Evidence adduced at the hearing pointed to the fact that selection in the
past had not adhered to a chronological order. But, argued respondents, such
deviations did not prove a section 296 violation as to Ballard, for no one ap-
plying after him was selected for the 1962-1963 classes. 52
Respondents contended, also that "Itihe exclusive white composition of
the applicants for apprentice appointment cannot by itself establish unlawful
discrimination."53 Admitting the primary importance of member sponsorship,
respondents maintained that it was nonetheless a legal device:
While this sponsorship system might concededly be described as
discriminatory in that it results in different treatment based on union
member sponsorship, it is not discriminatory in the sense of . . .
Section 296 which requires different treatment because of race or
color. The sponsorship system does result in discrimination against
every applicant who fails to secure a sponsor from amongst Local
50. Instant case at 2.
51. "The consideration, or lack of consideration, given to Ballard's application was
identical to that given to all applicants who were not appointed to the three apprentice
classes herein involved." Respondents' Brief, p. 7.
52. Id. at 6. This fact was contested by the complainant; see Attorney General's
Brief, p. 5 and instant case at 7.
53. Respondents' Brief, p. 26.
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28's membership. All applicants, regardless of race or color, are sub-
ject to this .... 14
The union and JAC arguments denying violation of section 296.1-a can
be summarized as assertions that a chronological selection practice was es-
tablished (even though not always adhered to), that sponsorship was in-
dispensable (even though it was a discriminatory device) but that there was
equality of discrimination under the sponsorship system (even though it oper-
ated to exclude one racial class completely.) The Commission concluded that
since 80 per cent of all apprentices in training were relatives of union members
and since the union was all-white, 55 the rejection of Ballard and of Negroes
as a class was automatic.
It is no defense to say that selection based on family ties affects
whites and non-whites alike, and therefore does not discriminate
against Negroes specifically. . . . Local 28 is not charged with dis-
crimination against a cross-section of all persons, but against Negroes
specifically. The fact that its practices may work against some white
persons at some time does not alter the fact that they work against
all Negro applicants at all times.56
In making this finding of a violation by Local 28 and JAC, the Commis-
sion cited alumni sponsorship5 7 and voting grandfathers 8 as analogous dis-
criminatory requirements that have been held unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court, and demolished the respondents' ingenious argument
of equality of opportunity in discrimination.
The legislative mandate governing this type of discrimination has been
clarified and extended by the recent amendment to section 296.1-a, effective
September 1, 1964.r, It is now an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) To select persons for an apprentice training program registered
with the state of New York on any basis other than their qualifica-
tions, as determined by objective criteria which permit review;
(b) To deny . . . any person because of his race, creed, color or
national origin the right to be admitted to or participate in . . . an
apprenticeship training program . . .60
54. Id. at 17.
55. Instant case at 3, 14.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
58. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
59. L. 1964, ch. 948, § 1. See also N.Y. Labor Law, § 815, as amended by L. 1964, ch.
948, § 2, effective September 1, 1964. Subdivision 5 of section 815 contains as a "suggested
standard" for apprenticeship agreements: "Provision that apprentices be selected on the
basis of qualification alone, as determined by objective criteria which permit review, and
without any direct or indirect limitation, specification or discrimination as to race, creed,
color or national origin."
60. The amendment deletes "qualified" as a limitation on the "persons" whose right
to admission is protected by this section, and supplies the standard upon which qualification
is to be determined: objective, reviewable criteria. The order of the Commission anticipates
this modification and, in paragraph 1, provides for an additional check upon the standards-
their evaluation by the Industrial Commissioner to test their "reasonableness" and "suit-
ability." See note 13 supra.
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2. Violation of Section 296.1(b)
The second violation found by the Commission involved Local 28 alone.
Section 296.1(b) states that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice:
For a labor organization, because of the age, race, creed, color or
national origin of any individual, to exclude or to expel from its
membership such individual or to discriminate in any way against
any of its members or against any employer or any individual em-
ployed by an employer."'
In reaching the conclusion that Local 28 excluded Ballard and all Negroes
from membership, the Commission's reasoning was built on these facts: that
the union tightly controlled and limited the number of craftsmen in sheet
metal work in New York City; that the history of the union revealed no
Negro apprentices and no Negro members in the past; that practically "the
only way of gaining admission into Local 28 is through apprenticeship," that
virtually "the only way of getting an apprenticeship is by being a son, nephew
or other close relative of a union member," and that such "close relatives" had,
without exception, turned out to be white. 02 The history and practice of Local
28 had consequently erected a racial bar to union membership.
3. Violation of Section 296.6
Thirdly, the Commission held that all individual respondents0 3 had
violated section 296.6 which provides that: "It shall be an unlawful dis-
criminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the
doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so."
Respondents' position on this issue was to challenge the basic jurisdiction of
the Commission to find and hold them individually culpable.
The two respondents who represented the Mechanical Contractors' Asso-
ciation on JAC argued sequentially: that the union alone selected apprentices;
that section 296.6 encompassed affirmative action only, that if section 296.6
reached passive approval, nevertheless such apathy on the part of the contrac-
tors was not tantamount to an endorsement of racial discrimination. The first
assertion was refuted by the terms of the agreement between the union and
employer (contractor) associations which required JAC approval for all ap-
prentices selected by the Local. Secondly, it was held by SCHR that "prac-
tice" as used in the pertinent section of the Law was "broad enough to embrace
61. While dearly the thrust of the case is admission to apprenticeship, the Com-
mission in its opinion and-in its order proceeded to attack the practice of Negro exclusion
from union membership. The facts of the case do not directly raise this issue, for Ballard
had not applied for membership, and was not identifiable with any of the three classes
protected by 296.1(b) from union discrimination, i.e., he was not a union member, employer,
or individual employed by an employer. The fact that the Commission reached out to cope
with this discriminatory practice as well as the apprenticeship problem underscores the
thoroughness of the pattern approach it utilized.
62. Instant case at 1s.
63. These were the president of the Local, the secretary of the Local and JAC,
union representatives on JAC and contractor representatives on JAC.
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a series of repeated and customary failures to act,"6 4 and "... failure of the
JAC to act, whether intentional or otherwise, helped, supported, encouraged,
and assisted Local 28 in the achievement of its discriminatory purpose, and
amounted to aiding and abetting within the meaning of Section 296.6.2 65
JAC representatives of the Sheet Metal Contractors advanced the argu-
ment one step further by denying that the individual members of JAC had
a positive legal duty to challenge Local 28's selection practices. The Commis-
sion held that JAC members as administrators of the trust fund created to
finance the apprentice training program were clothed with the special duties
of trustees, among which was the duty to participate with the union in se-
lecting apprentices.6 6 The abdication of that function constituted a violation
of a duty imposed by law.
4. Provisions of the Order
SCHR's order of March 20, 1964 in the instant case directs the respon-
dents to cease and desist from (a) denying, because of race or coor, the right
of qualified Negroes to be admitted to apprentice training; (b) aiding and
abetting the union and JAC in denying this right; (c) excluding Negroes from
union membership because of race or color.
The Commission ordered the following affirmative action:
Paragraph 1-Adoption of objective standards for apprentice selection,
such standards to be approved by the Industrial Commissioner. This paragraph
contains the explicit prohibition "that in no event shall sponsorship by a
member or members of Local Union 28 be adopted as a requirement either
for applying or being selected for apprentice training."
Paragraph 4-The compilation of a new waiting list based on new applica-
tions. Former apprentice applicants are required to reapply.
Paragraph 5-Advance notice to be given to the State Employment Serv-
ice and the New York City Board of Education of new apprentice classes to
be selected. Such announcement must contain particulars relating to the re-
quirements for applicants, date of application, period of instruction, etc.
Paragraph 8-Written statements to be furnished (upon applicant's re-
quest) to rejected applicants, detailing reasons for non-selection. If the appli-
cant asserts that he was rejected because of race, creed, color or national
origin, the union or JAC must advise him of his right to obtain review by a
designee of the Commissioner of Education.
Paragraph 9-Availability to SCHR of records relative to selection and
rejection of applicants.
Paragraph 10-Incorporation of a provision barring discrimination in
any apprenticeship agreement concluded by Local 28 and JAC.
64. Instant case at 18.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 20-21.
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Paragraph 1 1-Notification to SCHR within sixty days of compliance
measures undertaken by respondents.
The current petition for review filed by respondents centers on the roles
assigned to the Industrial Commissioner and to the Commissioner of Educa-
tion in evaluating and reviewing the selection practices of Local 28 and JAC.
But it is doubtful that this alleged unlawful delegation of power by SCHR
represents the fundamental objection of the union. It is more likely to be found
in that provision of the order which mandates the total elimination of union
sponsorship as a factor in the selection process. The union may have relied
on this device to accomplish much more than the exclusion of an applicant
whose color may have seemed objectionable to the membership. Sponsorship
could also be utilized as a device to centralize power and patronage within
the union, and to provide a job-secure future for sons and nephews who would
otherwise enter a competitive labor market untrained and unprotected.
CONCLUSIONS
The ShJet Metal Workers decision finds its place in the strengthening cur-
rent of thought and action which is wearing a new course in the vast area of
discrimination.6 7 Consequently, the future significance of the Commission's
opinion and order does not emanate from the findings of technical violations
of the Law or from the requirement for new, supervised standards of admis-
sion. Rather, it emerges from the conceptual broadening of the principle that
public responsibility comes from monopoly power. The Commission does not
interpret this principle as a statutory duty confluent with a statutory power
or privilege bestowed by the legislature, 68 but as a duty arising from the status
of the union as absolute arbiter of who may acquire the right to work 0 in a
67. At the same time that SCHR decided the Sheet Metal Workers case, it issued an
order in Mitchell v. R. & S. Plumbing & Mechanical Systems, Inc., C-9092-62 (1964)
(mimeo.) The real party respondent in the Plumbers case was not the company but Local
373 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe
Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (AFL-CIO). The all-white local which
controls the craft in Rockland County refused to admit a Negro journeyman. Complainant
had applied for membership after his employer signed an agreement to employ only Local
373 members. The Commission concluded that the union had violated section 296.1(b) of
the Law and ordered the union to admit applicants to membership without regard to race.
The union was directed to admit complainant to membership, if impartial tests (at which
a SCHR observer was present) qualified him as a journeyman. Furthermore, although
accessibility to apprentice training was not a patent issue in the case, SCHR ordered Local
373 to notify the State Employment Service of apprenticeship openings and to assure equal
opportunity to all applicants. In the Plumbers case, as in the instant case, the order of the
Commission extended beyond the redress of an individual grievance to the problem of
discrimination against Negroes generally, in the selection of apprentices as well as in the
admission of applicants for union membership.
68. Cf. Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1944). It was
held that the Railway Labor Act "imposes upon the statutory representative of a raft ...
a duty ... to protect the interests of the members of the craft. . . ." And Congress by the
Act imposed on the union a "duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf
of all those for whom it acts...."
69. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), ... the right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure."
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given craft. Such a role thrusts the union into a "quasi-public position"70 and
it cannot choose its members (and, one step further removed, its apprentices)
according to the preferences (or caprices) of a private, social club. The choice,
if predicated on subjective and nepotic standards operates as a denial of a
civil right-equality of opportunity to compete for a job in the labor mar-
ket.71
This definition of responsibility attaching to a dominant craft union is
buttressed by the Commission's determination that passive acquiescence in, or
a disclaimer of knowledge of, discriminatory admission standards is no defense
to any party who is administratively associated with the selection process.72
The duty blankets both acts of commission and of omission.
Finally, the Commission, while stating that its finding of discrimination is
based on a combination of practices73 which singly are not necessarily discrim-
inatory per se, employs clearly a "pattern of discrimination" approach. 74 The
application of such an approach to other craft unions is a logical next step.
Logically too, where violation of the Law is determined on the basis of a
comprehensive assessment of dependent factors, the Commission is enabled to
address its order to the more general problem of class exclusion. 75
Josephine King
70. Instant case at 17.
71. See, Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289
(July 1, 1964). This case arose in Houston and concerned a Negro and a white Local which
had been certified as the joint bargaining representative by the N.L.R.B. in 1961. The
contract covered two kinds of jobs: Group I-open only to whites and Group II-open
only to Negroes. The Negro local (No. 2) proposed that job segregation be gradually
eliminated. Local No. 1 refused, and entered into an agreement with the employer enlarging
the apprenticeship program with the understanding that apprenticeship would be available
only to white applicants. A rejected Negro applicant presented his grievance to Local
No. 1 which refused to process it. The N.L.R.B. found that sections 8(b) (1) (A), 8(b)(2)
and 8(b)(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act had been violated. The opinion
stated: "Specifically, we hold that the Board cannot validly render aid under Section 9 of
the Act to a labor organization which discriminates racially when acting as a statutory
bargaining representative." 56 L.R.R.M. 1294. The certification of both locals was rescinded
by the Board's order "because Locals Nos. 1 and 2 discriminated on the basis of race in
determining eligibility for full and equal membership, and segregated their members on the
basis of race." (Ibid.)
72. Instant case at 19.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 9. "Once evidence of a discriminatory practice is found, this Commission
may determine whether a general discriminatory pattern exists and order its elimination."
75. The instant case focuses on the responsibility of the union, since the union
controls the course of instruction which is indispensable to skill in the craft. The reverse side
of the coin is exposed in Matter of Myart and Motorola, Inc., Charge No. 63C-127 (Ill.
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 1964) (mimeo.) Myart contended that he was qualified
for the position of Analyzer and Phaser, but that Motorola refused to hire him because of
race. The respondent failed to produce Myart's application test, or competent testimony as
to the grade he had achieved, to substantiate respondent's allegation that Myart was not
qualified. The Hearing Examiner concluded that the company had engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices and ordered the employment of Myart as Analyzer and Phaser.
The most significant aspect of the case, however, may be found in the dictum rather
than in the decision of the case. The Hearing Examiner sharply criticized the form of the
examination administered to Myart. He noted that it was copyrighted in 1949 and
described it as obsolete. "Its norm was derived from standardization on disadvantaged
groups," and therefore did not provide ". . . equal opportunity to qualify for the culturally
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deprived. . . ." (p. 8) The order directed Motorola to discontinue use of this test; any
substituted examination must ". . . reflect and equate inequalities and environmental
factors among the disadvantaged.. ." (p. 9).The Examiner recognized, further, that revision of application tests and forms would
not incisively deal with the problem. He emphasized that:
Selection techniques may have to be modified at the outset in the light of the ex-
perience, education or attitudes of the group.... The employer may have to establish
in-plant training programs and employ the heretofore culturally deprived . . . as
learners, placing them under such supervision that will enable them to achieve job
success. (p. 10).
Thus, the employer may have to assume, ultimately, the responsibility for elevating
the unskilled and the uneducated to a plane at which they can realistically compete for
job opportunities.
